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ABSTRACT
AN EXPERIMEENTAL INVESTIGATION OF BUDGET REJECTION AUTHORITY PLACEMENT IN THREE-TIER
HIERARCHIES
BY
JAMES C. WILHELM
APRIL 22, 2019
Committee Chair:

Douglas E. Stevens

Major Academic Unit:

School of Accountancy

In a participative budgeting setting, this paper examines the relative merits of different choices regarding to whom to
assign budget rejection authority in a hierarchical firm. While the participative budgeting literature has traditionally
examined dyadic firms (i.e. firms consisting of only an owner and a worker), many firms exist as taller hierarchies.
In such firms, the question of where to locate an important budgetary control – rejection authority – in order to
promote improved budgetary reporting becomes meaningful. It is hypothesized that delegating budget rejection
authority to the manager leads to increased slack consumption by the agent in comparison to the situation in which
the principal retains such authority. Research questions address whether the agents report more accurately when
both the manager and the principal have rejection authority by comparison to the arrangement in which only one of
these individuals hold such power. Results generally suggest that delegating rejection authority to the manager does
not entail agency related costs. Further, agent slack capture is least when the control is duplicated but this benefit
comes at a substantial decrease in the amount of surplus the firm can capture.
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I. Introduction
This study examines how the choice of where to locate budget rejection authority within
a hierarchical firm impacts the reporting choices of agents in a participative budgeting setting.
Firms spend vast amounts of time and money on the budgeting process. While participative
budgeting provides a means for the principal to obtain the agent’s private, unobservable
information, thereby improving future firm performance through better planning, this benefit
comes at the cost of exposing the firm to the potential for opportunistic misreporting by the agent
(Jensen 2003). Given these concerns regarding the value of participative budgeting, a substantial
amount of accounting literature investigates means by which to ameliorate the downsides
associated with its use (for a review of the literature, see Rasmuβen 2015).
A feature common in most of the prior budgeting literature is that the firm is presumed to
have a flat structure – i.e. it consists of a principal and one or more (peer) subordinate agents. To
the contrary, many firms are organized as hierarchies in which there are one or more levels of
managers who act as intermediaries between the principal and the agent(s). Prior literature
generally suggests that firms add managerial levels when time constraints or informational
processing burdens on the principal become too great and force delegation of some duties to
managers (e.g. Harris and Raviv 2002, Colombo and Grilli 2013). Since the principal is typically
thought to have an array of duties, a question that arises when examining firms with more than
two hierarchical levels is whether the principal should delegate supervision of controls intended
to improve budgetary reporting to subordinate actors. This question is the focus of the current
study.
One of the most intuitive controls to place on the participative budgeting process is
budget rejection authority (Rankin, Schwartz, and Young 2008). While participative budgeting
5

allows the agent to be involved in the budgeting process, it is not often the case that they are
given carte blanche to set their own budget with no oversight from their superior. The rejection
authority implemented in Rankin et al (2008) reflects this fact. One of the general results from
that study (and the extensional Douthit and Stevens 2015) is that agents claim less budgetary
slack when principals are granted the authority to reject the agent’s budget. However, while
rejection authority would, by necessity, be held by the principal in a flat firm, if a hierarchical
firm wished to implement rejection authority, it faces an important choice regarding where to
locate such authority. Specifically, it could grant rejection authority to the principal, as in a flat
firm, or it could choose to delegate supervision of the control to a manager. Importantly, these
are independent decisions in the sense that the decision to grant rejection authority to one party
does not preclude granting such authority to the other party. This implies that, if rejection
authority has been implemented in a hierarchical firm, there are three possible cases. The
principal, alone, could retain the ability to reject the budget, this power could be delegated to the
manager alone, or both the principal and the manager could be granted rejection authority. The
last case is particularly important because it represents a situation in which a control has
effectively been duplicated, which has no analog in a flat firm.
Assuming that there are benefits to each of the choices above, the question then turns to
the relative benefits of each arrangement. In the absence of rejection authority, traditional agency
theory treats the presence of additional hierarchical levels as irrelevant to the decision of any of
the economic actors. Since preferences in such analyses are assumed to be solely for pecuniary
payoffs, the prediction is that the agent consumes the entirety of the available slack. As a result,
regardless of the vertical arrangement of the firm, the amount transferred to the residual claimant
(and to any other intermediate actors) is the same – zero. However, when rejection authority has
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been granted, the agent must take into account the fact that their budget can potentially be
rejected, and traditional agency theory predicts that slack capture is reduced as a result. This
should be the case regardless of where rejection authority exists within the firm.
When comparing the situations in which only one superior actor (i.e. the manager or the
principal) has rejection authority, I turn to traditional agency theory. The game theoretical
solution to the situation in which only the principal has rejection authority is that the agent
allocates more of the surplus to the manager (than when only the manager has rejection
authority) to ensure that the principal does not reject the budget. I therefore hypothesize that the
slack capture of agents will be greater when only the manager has budget rejection authority than
when only the principal has such authority.
When examining the case in which both superior actors have budget rejection authority, it
may seem straightforward and intuitively appealing to expect that less slack would be captured
by the agent than in circumstances in which only one superior actor holds such power. However,
due to changes in behaviour due to restrictions on autonomy, differences in perceptions of the
probability of budget rejection, and tradeoffs between preferences for fairness and concerns for
strategic issues, there are reasons to suspect that the average amount of slack captured by the
agent may increase. Due to these competing directional effects, I state two research questions to
examine how agent slack capture differs between the situation in which both the manager and
principal hold rejection authority and each of the two situations in which only one of these
individuals has rejection authority.
To test the hypothesis and explore the research questions, I conducted a 2x2 experiment
in which manager rejection authority and principal rejection authority are each manipulated at
two levels (absent/present). Participants take the role of either agent, manager, or principal in a

7

hypothetical three-tier hierarchical firm and interact over twelve periods to perform a budgeting
task based on the instruments used in Evans, Hannan, Krishnan and Moser (2001) and Rankin et
al (2008). 1 I find that, consistent with prior literature (e.g. Forsythe et al 1994, Rankin et al 2008,
Douthit and Stevens 2015), granting rejection authority to some superior actor in the firm’s
hierarchy (i.e. the manager and/or principal) leads to less slack capture on the part of the agent.
Contrary to the hypothesis, results suggest that there is no significant difference in slack capture
by the agent when only the manager has rejection authority compared to when only the principal
has rejection authority. Analysis of the research questions suggests that slack capture is
decreased by giving both the manager and the principal rejection authority by comparison to
giving only the principal such authority but that this comes at the cost of the firm foregoing a
substantial amount of their potential surplus due to budget rejections. 2 Additional analyses
provide insight into the fact that the information asymmetry present in the setting causes superior
actors (the manager and principal) to struggle with identifying the exact characteristics of the
reports they receive, sometimes leading to what appear to be strictly irrational choices.
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. From an academic
perspective, this paper explores theory that suggests that implementation of budgetary rejection
authority at the manager level entails an agency cost stemming from increased misreporting at
the agent level. From a practitioner’s standpoint, this paper provides empirical evidence to guide
management accountants as they make choices with regards to which control tasks should be
delegated to which members of the firm. Specifically, the agency costs outlined above are not

1
This study takes the three-tier hierarchical structure of the firm as given. Section two briefly discusses why
managers may exist, thereby leading to a three-tier (or taller) structure.
2
This result is similar in spirit to the results described in Baiman et al (2007) in which the authors demonstrate
analytically that an internal auction mechanism can allocate firm resources in a first-best, socially efficient manner,
but only at a cost to the principal of paying out costly incentives to the manager.
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observed which suggests that firms can delegate rejection authority to managers without fear of
inducing poorer agent reporting. Further, this study presents, to the best of my knowledge, the
first evidence of the effects of implementation of redundant controls; when both the manager and
the principal have rejection authority, the same control (i.e. budget rejection) has been
implemented at different levels in the firm. Results indicate that implementing rejection authority
at both the manager and principal levels results in the lowest amount of agent misreporting,
implying that firms may profitably employ multiple levels of budgetary review.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides background and develops the
hypothesis and research questions. Section three explains the experiment used to test the
predictions, which is followed by a discussion of the analyses. Section five concludes.

II. BACKGROUND and DEVELOPMENT of HYPOTHESES
Background
Participative budgeting has been explored for at least six decades. The earliest study,
Argyris (1952), recommended that participative budgeting be implemented in firms to alleviate
dysfunctional behaviours resulting from the pressure to achieve mandated budget targets. From
an efficiency standpoint, participative budgeting allows the firm to integrate useful information
held only by those individuals who perform the firm’s day-to-day operations which can lead to
improved decision-making (Horngren et al 2018). In contrast to both the notional benefits of this
budgeting method and the fact that it is frequently observed in practice (Shields and Shields
1998), the traditional agency theory analysis of the participative budgeting arrangement suggests
that it should have little value (Jensen 2003). Agents are predicted to misreport their private
information to the full extent possible due to a misalignment of the incentives between the agent
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and principal stemming from a formulation of the utility function as only admitting arguments
for wealth and leisure (Ross 1973, Jensen and Meckling 1976). In an attempt to reconcile these
contradictory observations, several accounting studies have noted that agents have preferences
for non-pecuniary sources of utility. Such preferences tend to ease the misalignment of
incentives between the principal and agent, implying that the participative budgeting
arrangement does provide value, even from a theoretical standpoint. Examples of such nonpecuniary factors are the preference for honesty (Evans et al 2001), the desire to appear honest
in the face of an information system (Hannan et al 2006, Abdel-Rahim and Stevens 2018),
concerns for reputation formation (Stevens 2002), non-binding communication (Rankin et al
2003), and agents’ perceptions of the principal’s fairness (Zhang 2008).
As an alternative to any of the control mechanisms described above, the firm could
attempt to encourage better reporting behaviour by implementing budget rejection authority – i.e.
the principal is granted the right to reject the agent’s budget proposal. Should the budget be
rejected, the firm’s surplus is lost (see Rankin et al 2008, Hannan et al 2010, and Douthit and
Stevens 2015). Studies generally find that agents misreport less when faced with the possibility
that their budget may be rejected.
As noted above, however, the bulk of accounting studies in this area portray the firm as
having only two levels (i.e. one level inhabited by the principal and a subordinate level populated
by all the, possibly numerous, agents). It is certainly the case that some firms are structured in
this fashion, but a great many firms exist as taller hierarchies. Literature in economics explores
the question of why firms with more than one agent adopt any particular vertical structure and
what the optimal hierarchical structure should be (see e.g. Calvo and Wellisz 1978, Keren and
Levhari 1979, Qian 1994). Regardless of the firm’s exact hierarchical structure, a point that is
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made repeatedly in this stream of literature is that humans are boundedly rational – i.e. they do
not possess the ability to instantly process an infinite amount of information (Simon 1957,
Williamson 1967, van Zandt 1996). This means that as the firm expands (and there are strong
incentives to do so – namely monopoly power; Knight 2009) there inevitably comes a point at
which the principal can no longer process all the information generated by the firm and no longer
has sufficient time to monitor all the agents. As a consequence, the principal must delegate some
of their responsibility to one of the agents. Presuming that the delegated tasks are supervisory in
nature, such as budgetary review, it must be the case that a managerial layer of the firm results. 3
Additionally, while there is some evidence that firms may be decreasing their height by
eliminating some hierarchical levels (Rajan and Wulf 2006), there is also empirical evidence that
firms grow taller, particularly as they “grow up” from their initial owner-operated structure to
one that includes middle management (Colombo and Delmastro 1999, Colombo and Grilli 2013).
The preceding discussion leads to two, first-principles questions with regards to rejection
authority in hierarchical firms (Young 2010). First, because the surplus available from the
agent’s improved reporting may be consumed by an intermediate actor (i.e. the manager) before
it reaches the principal, is rejection authority still useful in hierarchical firms? Second, if
rejection authority is implemented, where within the firm’s hierarchy should it be implemented?
While there have been a handful of studies in the accounting literature that examine firms that
are taller than a dyad, these either investigate topics other than participative budgeting (e.g.
Hales and Williamson 2010, Arshad et al 2018, Kuang and Yang 2017), or deviate from the

As long as the marginal product of each of the responsibilities that the principal retains exceed their marginal
product of budgetary review, it is sensible to grant budgetary control (e.g. budget rejection authority) to the
manager. This is the case even if the information asymmetry between the manager and the agent is identical to the
information asymmetry between the principal and the agent.
3
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stylized conception of how information flows within hierarchical firms (Cardinaels et al 2014;
for discussion of information flows see Shun and Yun 2017).

Development of Hypotheses
This study uses a design adapted from the standard budgeting setting found in Evans et al
(2001) and Rankin et al (2008) to examine participative budgeting in a firm with three
hierarchical levels. At the top of the firm exists the principal who acts as residual claimant. At
the next lower level is a manager whose duty is to aggregate and pass on budgetary requests
from the agent who resides at the lowest level of the firm. This setup is consistent with many
studies in the economics literature on optimum firm height (e.g. Keren and Levhari 1979,
Marschak and Reichelstein 1998, Jun and Kim 2010). In this basic setting, the agent possesses
private and unverifiable information about the firm’s production cost. They then make a cost
report to the manager. If the agent misrepresents their cost by stating a cost higher than the one
they observe, they consume the difference between their report and their actual information as
budgetary slack. The manager receives the agent’s cost report as their own private information
and then allocates the resulting profit between themselves and the principal. Two manipulations
introduce the ability for one or more of the superior actors to reject the budget. Specifically,
manager rejection authority is manipulated as either present or absent and principal rejection
authority is manipulated as either present or absent. If the budget is rejected (in conditions in
which budget rejection authority exists), production is suspended, and no member of the firm
claims any of the available surplus (defined as the firm’s revenue less the agent’s private cost
information).
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The basic setting (i.e. that does not incorporate budget rejection authority) is a natural
extension of Evans et al (2001) with an additional hierarchical level. Further, one of the
important commentaries in Rankin et al (2008) is that the participative budgeting setting is
structurally similar to either a dictator game (absent rejection authority) or an ultimatum game
(with rejection authority). 4,5 Consequently, the participative budgeting setting in which no
rejection authority has been implemented can be compared to two, back-to-back (or sequential)
dictator games. The agent acts as the first dictator who makes an allocation between themselves
and the manager by reporting their privately observed production cost. The manager then uses
the information sent to them by the agent to make a dictator allocation between themselves and
the principal. As noted in the previous section, while the traditional agency theory prediction is
that the agent will consume the entirety of the available surplus by reporting the maximum
possible cost, there is overwhelming evidence that this prediction is not empirically descriptive.
Dictators don’t always take their entire endowment in dyadic relationships (see Camerer 2003
for an extensive review) and in sequential dictator games, the first mover has been shown to send
somewhat less than 30% of their initial endowment, on average (Bonein and Serra 2008 and
Bahr and Requate 2014). However, these studies also show that while the prediction of
completely self-interested behaviour is not, on average, observed empirically, there are frequent
instances in which the entire pie is consumed by the dictator. For example, in Forsythe et al
(1994), between 21% and 36% of dictators sent nothing, depending on the size of the stakes;

In a dictator game, a dictator is given an endowment (often $10) and asked to split it with a receiver (Kahneman et
al 1986). The players each receive the allocated amounts. An ultimatum game is very similar in that a proposer is
given an endowment and asked to split the amount with a receiver. The difference is that the receiver can either
accept or reject the proposed allocation. If they accept, both players receive the allocated amounts; if they reject both
players receive nothing (Güth et al 1982).
5
The participative budgeting setting deviates from the traditional dictator setting in that the dictator's (agent's)
endowment is hidden and stochastic. Further, preferences for honesty are a potential element in the participative
budgeting setting as the dictator must make a factual assertion, which is not a component of the traditional dictator
setting.
4
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similarly, Evans et al (2001) find that between 27% and 29% of agents (which is the functional
equivalent of the dictator role in their study) send nothing. It is important to note that in
participative budgeting setting, situations in which the agent consumes the entire pie imply that
the firm earns no profit, even though profitable production can usually occur.
As discussed above, a means to reduce not only the average slack capture by the agent
but also the incidence of complete slack capture, would be to incorporate rejection authority.
Presumably, this control should be effective regardless of where it is situated within the
hierarchy. However, unless this result is empirically confirmed, interpretation of the remainder
of the study would be challenging. Consequently, I state the following proposition:

Proposition: Regardless of where it is located within the firm’s hierarchy, rejection authority
leads to less average slack capture by agents compared to the condition in which no rejection
authority is granted.

Presuming that granting rejection authority somewhere within the hierarchy serves to
improve reporting from the agent, the interesting question then becomes exactly where to locate
such authority. The most conservative choice, in terms of cost and ease of implementation,
would be to grant rejection authority to a single individual - either the manager only or the
principal only. Extending the discussion comparing participative budgeting to dictator and
ultimatum games suggests that when only the manager has rejection authority, participative
budgeting in a three-tier hierarchy is comparable to a sequential ultimatum-dictator game.
Similarly, the situation in which only the principal has rejection authority can be compared to a
sequential dictator-ultimatum game. Under standard agency theory assumptions, the agent is
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predicted to capture less slack in the latter case (i.e. principal only rejection authority) than in the
former case. An example is illustrative.
Assume that the agent has $10 to allocate and the smallest indivisible unit is $1. In an
ultimatum-dictator arrangement (i.e. rejection authority granted to only the manager), the
traditional agency theory prediction is that the agent keeps $9 and sends $1 to the manager. This
is because the agent needs to send them only the smallest amount to ensure that the manager
accepts the proposal – the principal is not a concern. 6 The manager accepts, keeps the $1, and
sends nothing to the owner.
When only the principal has rejection authority, and under the same endowment
assumptions as the previous paragraph, the agent is predicted to keep $8 and send $2 to the
manager (Güth et al 1996). To see why this is, consider the usual prediction for a dyadic
ultimatum game. If the agent keeps $9 and sends the manager $1, the manager has two choices.
On one hand, they can keep the $1 and send $0 to the principal, who is likely to reject the
proposal. On the other hand, they can keep $0 and send $1 to the principal who will accept the
proposal. In either event, the manager’s payoff is $0, and they are therefore indifferent between
the two choices. Note that the agent would prefer that the manager send the $1 to the principal
(because the agent gets to keep what they allocated to themselves if the principal accepts), but
due to the manager’s indifference, there is no guarantee of this happening. To solve this issue,
the agent must send $2 to the manager, who then keeps $1 and sends $1 to the principal thereby
assuring the latter’s acceptance. Using the underlying economic games to draw conclusions

Technically speaking, there are two subgame perfect equilibria in the basic ultimatum game (Forsythe et al 1994).
In one, the proposer sends nothing and the responder, gaining no utility from rejecting such a proposal, accepts
(Güth et al 1982). However, since the responder is indifferent between rejecting and accepting, they could equally
choose to reject which implies that the proposer does better, in expectation, by sending the minimum possible
amount which they know the receiver will not reject (Abbink et al 1999). This is the second SPE.

6
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about the budgeting setting, one can see that the prediction is that the agent captures less slack
when only the principal holds rejection authority than when only the manager holds rejection
authority, as hypothesized below:

H1: Average slack capture by agents will be greater when only the manager has budget rejection
authority than when only the principal has budget rejection authority.

Rather than granting budget rejection authority at a single level in the hierarchy, the firm
could choose to give both the manager and the principal this authority. When both superior
actors (i.e. the manager and the principal) have budget rejection authority, the setting resembles a
sequential ultimatum game – the agent and the manager are both proposers whose recipients can
potentially reject their proposals (Güth et al 1996). The game theoretic solution in this case is
identical to the situation in which only the principal has rejection authority: the agent sends twice
the minimum amount to the manager who keeps half, sending the minimum amount to the
principal (using the example from above, the payoffs would be $8/$1/$1 to the
agent/manager/principal). Thus, traditional agency theory predicts that there is no value to
granting rejection authority to the manager when the principal also possesses this authority.
Moving away from the traditional agency theory predictions, this setting is essentially a
combination of the settings in which the individual superior actors have rejection authority and it
is intuitively appealing to posit that slack capture should be less when both superior actors can
reject the budget. While there is literature that examines the interplay of the various components
of management control systems (e.g. Kennedy and Widener 2008), there appears to be a dearth
of studies that examine the effects of multiple, duplicated, controls. Despite this, conditional on
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the effects of granting rejection authority being additive and linear, agents should claim less
slack than in either of the instances in which only one of the superior actors have rejection
authority.
There are, however, several reasons to suspect that the effect of duplicated rejection
authority may not be linear or additive. First, it important to recognize that while rejection
authority has been duplicated, it has been duplicated at adjacent hierarchical levels, not within
the same level. In other words, it is not the case that the agent makes an allocation between
themselves and the principal which is first reviewed by the manager and then subsequently
reviewed by the principal. Instead, the manager reviews the agent’s choice and then incorporates
a choice of their own before the principal has an opportunity to make their approve or reject
decision. This implies a substantially more complex strategic environment than in the dyadic
relationship, one in which linear and additive effects of incorporating budget rejection may not
be observed.
Second, the motivation crowding literature often explains the counter-intuitive result that
the imposition of a control decreases the desired behaviour relative to a situation in which the
control is absent by appealing to the notion that individuals have a dispreference for restricted
autonomy (Frey and Jegen 2001, Falk and Kosfeld 2006). Since there are two individuals who
can potentially reject the budget, the agent may perceive that the choice set that leads to budget
acceptance has been substantially restricted. and, as a result, that their autonomy has been
reduced. This suggests that the motivation crowding effects observed elsewhere in the literature
may lead to increased slack capture when both superior agents have budget rejection authority.
Third, and related to the prior argument, multiple “rejection nodes” (i.e. places in the
hierarchy at which the budget can be rejected) likely influence the agent’s perception of the
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chance that the budget will be rejected. Specifically, if both the manager and principal can reject
the budget, there is a (weakly) greater chance that the budget will be rejected than when only one
of those two individuals possess rejection authority. Further, to the extent that agents,
irrespective of the condition, have a desired expected payoff in mind when they make a report,
this increased probability of rejection should influence their reporting. Expected value has two
parts – a probability and a payoff magnitude. Since the probability of rejection increases due to
the addition of another rejection node, the only way the agent can maintain their desired expected
payoff is to increase the magnitude of the payoff. This would be accomplished by building in
additional slack, implying that greater slack is captured by agents when both the principal and
the agent have rejection authority than when one or the other alone has such authority.
Finally, Knez and Camerer (1995) and Camerer (2003) make the point that a fundamental
difference between dictator and ultimatum games is the presence of a strategic component to
ultimatum games. Specifically, proposers in ultimatum games must respect the fact that the
responder can reject their proposal. This leads the average proposer to offer a larger share to the
receiver. However, the fact that dictators send anything to receivers in dictator games suggests
that preferences for fairness (or altruism) do exist. It is difficult to disentangle these two
motivations (strategic concerns and preferences for fairness) in an ultimatum game because they
look identical from a behavioural standpoint – i.e. the proposer sends more money. The
aforementioned papers point out that it may be the case that fairness motivations drive behaviour
less in ultimatum games than in dictator games because the responder in an ultimatum game can
“stick up for themselves.” Moving back to the current study, in both conditions in which only
one superior actor has rejection authority, one of them is subject to receiving an allocation from a
dictator. However, when both superior actors have rejection authority, this is no longer the case
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and may suggest that the agent claims more slack because both the manager and the principal are
able to impact their own payoffs. 7 This argument is consistent with Rankin et al (2008) who
posit that the strategic component introduced by granting budget rejection authority serves to
reduce the perception of budgeting as an ethical dilemma.
Given the competing effects described in the preceding discussion, I pose the following
two research questions:

RQ1: Do agents capture more slack on average when both the manager and the principal have
rejection authority by comparison to the setting in which only the manager has rejection
authority?
RQ2: Do agents capture more slack on average when both the manager and the principal have
rejection authority by comparison to the setting in which only the principal has rejection
authority?

III. Method
Experimental Design and Procedures
To examine the posed questions, I conducted a 2x2 full-factorial experiment in which the
presence of managerial authority to reject the budget and the presence of principal authority to
reject the budget are each manipulated at two levels (absent/present) between-subjects. This
leads to four conditions: None (i.e. no rejection authority), Manager (only the manager has

Note that this argument does not suggest that lowest average slack capture should be observed in the condition in
which no rejection authority exists. The argument is that concerns for fairness exist both when rejection authority is
present and when it is not, but that these concerns are replaced, to some degree, by strategic concerns when rejection
authority is present. The argument made in the text is that fairness concerns are suppressed when there is no dictator
allocation in the hierarchy – i.e. when both superior agents have rejection authority.

7
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rejection authority), Principal (only the principal has rejection authority), and Both (the manager
and the principal have rejection authority).
Upon entering the laboratory, participants were seated at computer terminals separated by
privacy partitions. After a brief introduction by an experimental facilitator, computerized
instructions were provided, followed by a computerized quiz. In the event that a participant
answered a question incorrectly, they were given reminder information about the relevant portion
of the instructions and required to answer the question correctly before proceeding.
Participants are assigned a role – either agent, manager, or principal - at random and
maintain their roles for the duration of the experimental session. 8 Participants are informed that
they will be grouped into firms consisting of one of each of the three roles and that these firms
will be maintained throughout the session. The participants interact for twelve periods by
completing a task adapted from Evans et al (2001). The task of each firm is to prepare a
production budget for each period and each member of the firm receives a salary to compensate
them for their budgeting efforts. The salaries of the participants in other roles are kept hidden
(e.g. the manager is unaware of the magnitude of the salary provided to either the principal or the
agent and vice versa). Agents receive $5.00, managers receive $7.50, and principals receive
$10.00 at the beginning of each period. These values were selected in order to approximately
equalize average payoffs across the roles.
In the None condition, the budgeting process starts with the agent being provided private
information regarding the production cost for the period. Costs are drawn from a uniform
distribution with support of [$13.00, $27.00]. 9 Twelve costs were randomly generated prior to

During the experiment, these roles were referred to as Worker, Manager, and Owner, respectively. For expositional
clarity, I will continue to use the terms agent, manager, and principal throughout the manuscript.
9
As indicated in the text, all costs are presented to the participants in dollars, rather than experimental currency units
(ECUs). There is a substantial literature in economics regarding money illusion, which describes differences in
8
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the experimental sessions and presented in a random order to each agent. After observing the
production cost for the period, the agent then reports a cost to the manager. The agent consumes
any difference between their report and the actual cost as budgetary slack. The manager then
sends a report to the principal regarding the amount of profit that the principal will receive. In
each period, the firm receives $27.00 of revenue from sales of the product they produce. The
profit available for the manager to send to the principal is the difference between the firm’s
revenue and the agent’s reported cost. Any profits that are not sent to the principal are retained
by the manager. At the end of each round, participants receive only reminder information about
the decision(s) they made during the round that has just been completed before moving on to the
subsequent period (this design choice is discussed in greater detail below). In each round, each
role has additional questions to answer immediately following the decisions detailed above. The
manager is asked to give an estimate of the actual production cost and the owner is asked to give
an estimate of the available amount of profit. After round twelve, process measures are collected.
Following the post-experiment questionnaire, one period was selected at random for
payment and the results of the decisions from that period were shown to the participants. Once
this information was digested, the participants were paid in private for the selected period. With
the exception of the private production cost provided to the agent and the salaries of the
respective members of the firm, the experimental process and parameters were common
knowledge among all participants.
In the conditions in which one or more of the participants have rejection authority, the
individual with such authority is asked to either approve or reject the budget before they make

behaviour stemming from maximization of nominal currency rather than real currency. Prior experimental studies
provide some indication that denominating payoffs in ECUs can lead to important differences in the choices of
participants (see, e.g. Mazar et al 2008) which is why all payoffs are denominated in dollars in this study, which is
also consistent with the design choice made in Evans et al (2001).
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their decision (if any). For example, in the Both condition, the manager receives the production
cost report from the agent after which they are asked to either approve or reject the budget.
Conditional on the manager approving the budget, they then divide the available profit between
themselves and the principal. The principal then decides to either approve or reject the allocation.
If any of the individuals with rejection authority choose to reject the budget, production does not
occur for that period and each member of the firm receives only their salary. If all the individuals
with rejection authority approve the budget, production occurs as budgeted. In these conditions,
the worker is asked, immediately following their production cost report, to estimate the
probability that the budget will be approved by the individual (or individuals) with rejection
authority. Figure 1 provides a decision tree for the three roles and the range of values that their
choices could take.

FIGURE 1
Experiment Decision Tree for Each Condition

22

Design Choices
Two specific design choices warrant additional discussion. The first is the decision to
provide only reminder information at the end of each period. This choice was made to address
concerns regarding the ability to compare the None condition to the conditions in which one or
more actors have the ability to reject the budget. As noted in the previous section, the None
condition is the functional equivalent of a sequential dictator game. As such, no learning
regarding what acceptable behaviour entails can occur since the agent and the manager make
dictator allocations which cannot be rejected. By comparison, in the other three conditions, the
provision of even own-payoff information at the end of the period implies a degree of learning
regarding the acceptable amount of surplus to retain. For example, if the agent reports a
particular cost and the budget is rejected (regardless of who, specifically, has rejection authority),
they can infer that the production cost they reported was too high. To the extent that this
feedback provides cues regarding acceptable behaviour, this suggests that it would be technically
inappropriate to compare the None condition to any of the other conditions because of a perfect
confound between the manipulated variables and the opportunity to learn about cues to
acceptable behaviour. Such cues have repeatedly been shown to influence choices (e.g. Bicchieri
2006). As a result, while it is uncommon not to provide information on at least own-payoffs at
the end of each period, the instrument described above withholds this information until the end
of the experiment (for examples of such a design choice, however, see Abbink et al 1999).
In addition to the above discussion, keeping information restricted is attractive for two
other reasons. First, because no information regarding the actions of the other actors in the firm
is provided, there is no reason to re-pair participants. This enables me to provide each member of
the firm with each of the twelve costs. If own-payoff information were provided, this would
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necessitate re-pairing each round to avoid reputation formation and it would be exceedingly
difficult, if not impossible, to prevent the manager and principal from being grouped multiple
times with an agent facing a particular cost. For example, a manager could, in theory, end up
being paired with an agent that faced the highest production cost in all twelve rounds. This
substantially curtails opportunities for analysis of the behaviour of the managers and principals.
Relatedly, providing no payoff feedback after each round enables me to analyze an individual
agent’s set of choices over the full set of costs, free from any influence regarding whether their
budget proposal had been rejected in the prior period. The influence of changing costs is often
expected to have an impact in participative budgeting studies, but the analysis of this effect is
often contaminated by the impact of decisions made in previous rounds (e.g. a budget proposal
being rejected).
Second, the goal of this study is to examine budgeting in a single-period setting. While
dynamic budgeting settings present interesting opportunities for research, they are outside the
scope of the current study. As this is the case, withholding feedback until the end of the
experiment better preserves the independence of observations in each round which is more in
line with the single-period setting that is of primary interest.
The second design choice that requires additional explication is the structure of the salary
information provision. Keeping the salary of the superior actors hidden is consistent with prior
literature that attempts to control for the distributive preferences of agents (Douthit and Stevens
2015). While this is not the focus of the current study, it does provide control for distributive
fairness preferences that exist orthogonal to the decision by an agent to report a specific cost.
However, this study also keeps hidden the salary of the subordinate members of the firm (e.g.
the principal does not know the salary of the manager or agent). While it is appealing to endow
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the principal with a salary from which the salaries of the manager and agent are taken, the
concern described above regarding learning makes this choice problematic. Specifically, when,
for example, the principal has rejection authority, if they were aware of the salary of the
manager, they would have more complete payoff information regarding the relative payoffs to
themselves and the manager than the manager would have when they made their profit report.
The same dynamic exists between the manager and agent when the manager has rejection
authority. While the agent’s behaviour is the focus of this study, the choice was made to maintain
bilateral information asymmetry regarding the salaries of each individual to facilitate
supplemental analyses regarding the behaviour of the managers and principals.

Participants
Participants were 231 undergraduate students at a public university in the United States
who were recruited from a participant database. Average compensation (which included a $5
show-up payment) was $13.68 for agents, $14.17 for managers, and $15.88 for principals and
63% of participants were female. The experiment was administered using the zTree software
(Fischbacher 2007) and IRB approval was obtained prior to administering the experiment. A
requirement for using the laboratory in which this study was conducted is that no deception is
employed.

IV. RESULTS
This section begins with a discussion of the descriptive statistics and is followed by tests
of the predictions. The section concludes with a series of supplemental analyses.
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Descriptive Statistics
Average slack capture by the agent across the four conditions is presented in Table 1 and
box plots provide a visual summary of the data in Figure 2. Slack capture is measured in a
manner consistent with prior literature as [Reported Cost – Actual Cost]/[$27 – Actual Cost].
Recall that $27 is the maximum cost that can be reported. Note that this measure is unaffected by
whether the budget was rejected or not; it is, in essence, the attempted slack capture by the agent.
As can be seen in the table, the most slack was captured, on average, in the None condition and
the least amount of slack was captured in the Both condition. Additional descriptive information
is provided in Figure 3, which shows the average amount of slack capture by agents across the
various actual costs. Recall from the experimental design that each agent saw all twelve predrawn costs in a random order. One of the surprising results from this figure is that the percent of
slack captured seems largely invariant to the cost. This runs contrary to intuition that suggests
that, when there is more room to share surplus (i.e. when the actual cost is lower), agents tend to
capture less slack.

Tests of Predictions
Table 2 presents t-test comparisons of the average amount of slack captured in the
various conditions. The proposition states that slack capture will be greatest in the None
condition (i.e. where no rejection authority has been granted). Not surprisingly, strong support
provided for the proposition. Table 2, Panel A shows that comparisons of average slack between
the None condition and the other three conditions all indicate that the average slack capture in the
None condition is statistically greater. As speculated in the development of the proposition, the
number of reports of the maximum possible cost (i.e. $27) are substantially higher in the None
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics
Percent Slack Capture a by Condition

Condition
None
n = 240

Mean % Slack
(Std. Dev)
0.7756
(0.3345)

Manager
n = 240

0.5632
(.3145)

Principal
n = 240

0.5933
(.2636)

Both
n = 204

0.4992
(.2668)

a

Slack capture is measured as (Reported Cost - Actual Cost)/($27 - Actual Cost). This measure is
unaffected by a budget rejection; in essence it is the amount of attempted slack capture.

condition (130 reports) than in the Manager, Principal, or Both conditions (34, 26, and 13
reports, respectively). The results of the t-tests are also supported in untabulated regression
analysis in which slack capture is regressed on the conditions. A note about the regression
analyses conducted in this paper is in order. As the dependent variable, slack capture, is a
percentage bounded by zero and one, standard OLS regressions are inappropriate. Further, logit,
probit and tobit regressions are not appropriate because, in the case of logit and probit, values of
zero or one are undefined and, in the case of tobit, the data has not been censored. Consequently,
I follow the recommendation of Baum (2008) and use a generalized linear model with a logit link
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function and the binomial family clustering standard errors at the individual level. All referenced
regressions use this method unless otherwise noted.

FIGURE 2
Box Plots: Slack Capture by Condition
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FIGURE 3
% Slack Capture by Actual Cost
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TABLE 2: Tests of Predictions
Panel A: Tests of Proposition
t-statistic
7.17
6.63
9.51

Slack (None ) > Slack(Principal )
Slack (None ) > Slack(Manager )
Slack (None ) > Slack(Both )

a

p-value
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01

Panel B: Tests of Hypothesis
t-statistic
1.14

Slack (Manager ) > Slack(Principal )

a

p-value
0.87

Panel C: Tests of Research Questions
t-statistic
2.27
3.73

RQ1: Slack(Both ) < Slack(Manager)
RQ2: Slack(Both ) < Slack(Principal)

a

b

p-value
0.02
<0.01

: All t-tests one-tailed

b

: All t-tests two-tailed

Recall that H1 predicts that, when only the manager is granted budget rejection authority,
slack capture by agents is greater than when only the principal has budget rejection authority. As
show in Table 2, Panel B, no support is found for the prediction that agents misreport more in the
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Manager condition than in the Principal condition (p-value 0.87, one-tailed). This conclusion is
supported in a regression framework as well. This suggests that, contrary to the agency theory
prediction, delegating budget rejection authority entails no cost in terms of increased
misreporting from the agent. The actual cost does not load if it is included in the regression
specification, in line with the above commentary regarding the constancy of slack capture over
differing actual costs.
Turning to the research questions, cell mean comparisons show that slack capture is less
when both the principal and the manager have rejection authority (49.92% slack claimed) by
comparison to when either the manager only (56.32% slack claimed) or the principal only
(59.33% slack claimed) possess such authority. Table 2, Panel C shows that these differences are
significant at conventional levels (Manager vs. Both p-value 0.02; Principal vs. Both p-value
<0.01, both two-tailed). However, neither of these conclusions are supported in a regression
framework. Untabulated regression analysis suggests that granting budget rejection authority to
both the manager and principal reduces slack capture by a marginally statistically significant (pvalue 0.11) compared to granting only the principal rejection authority, but that there is no
benefit over granting only the manager such authority (p-value 0.37). The choice to cluster
standard errors at the individual level in the regression framework described above is a
conservative choice. A regression in which the standard errors are not clustered (but robust
standard errors are still used) shows that slack capture in the Both condition is significantly less
than in either the Principal (p<0.01) or the Manager conditions (p=0.02). Furthermore, a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distributions supports this result by indicating that the
values in the Both condition are smaller than in the Principal condition (p<0.01) and the
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Manager condition (p<0.01). Overall, the results indicate that granting both parties rejection
authority provides significant benefits in terms of curbing misreporting by the agent.

Supplemental Analyses
Analyses Related to the Research Questions
The theory section suggests three reasons why slack capture in the Both condition might
be greater than when only one actor possesses rejection authority. First, motivation crowding due
to additional control implementation was conjectured to lead to greater slack capture in the Both
condition. Second, since the likelihood that the budget is accepted is lower in the Both condition,
it was theorized that participants may capture more slack to maintain a constant expected value.
Finally, a speculation was made that strategic elements inherent to the sequential ultimatum
setting may displace some concerns for fairness thereby leading to greater slack capture in the
Both condition. While the results presented above relative to the research questions indicate that
slack capture is less when both superior actors have rejection authority, it is worthwhile to
provide evidence that the putative causal mechanisms were not in operation.
Prior literature suggests that motivation crowding is caused by individuals exhibiting a
dispreference for restrictions on their autonomy (Frey and Jegen 2001, Falk and Kosfeld 2006).
In the post-experiment questionnaire (PEQ), each agent was asked two questions intended to
gain insight into their perception of autonomy. Specifically, agent participants were asked, “How
much control do you feel you had over your budget report?” and, “How restricted did you feel
your choices were when reporting your production cost?” 10 The responses to these questions are
significantly correlated (pairwise correlation 0.41, p-value<0.01) so they are (additively)

Responses were on an 11-point Likert scale in which one was no control/very restricted and eleven was complete
control/not at all restricted.

10
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combined into one measure. Comparisons across conditions indicate that agents in the None
condition felt that they had significantly more autonomy than in the any of the conditions
incorporating rejection authority (all p-values<0.05). However, compared to the Both condition,
there is no significant difference in perceived autonomy in the Manager condition (11.94 vs.
13.95, p=0.26) and only a marginally significant higher degree of autonomy in the Principal
condition (11.94 vs. 14.75, p=0.08). 11 Note that while there is some indication that autonomy
restriction exists, there appears to be no evidence of motivation crowding as slack capture is less
in the conditions in which autonomy restriction is higher.
As discussed in the experimental design section, after their budget report was made, the
agents were asked to estimate how likely they felt the budget was to be approved by the
individual(s) with rejection authority. 12 An examination of agents’ responses shows that agents
did not perceive a lower probability that the budget would be approved in the Both condition
than in either the Principal or Manager conditions (Both: 50.7%, Principal: 45.7%, Manager:
52.9%). The general pattern that emerges from the agents’ responses is that agents indicated a
significantly greater likelihood that the budget would be accepted when the manager had
rejection authority than when the principal alone had such authority (Both vs. Principal p=0.04;
Both vs. Manager p<0.01). A plausible explanation for these observations would be that the
agent perceives a narrower social distance with the manager in the conditions in which the
manager has rejection authority, thus leading to a higher perceived probability that the budget
will be approved. However, an analysis of two questions intended to measure the agent’s
perceived social distance to the manager show no significant differences between conditions (all

11
12

No significant differences are observed between the Manager and Principal conditions (13.95 vs. 14.75, p=0.57).
This was asked on a Likert scale with eleven choices ranging between 0% and 100% in 10% increments.
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p>0.10). 13 Another possible reason for the deviation from the expected results of the perceived
probability of approval is that, while the agent made their cost report and their probability
assessment decisions sequentially, it is quite likely that these two decisions are inextricably
linked. As a result, if the agents had been asked about the relative unconditional probability that
cost reports are rejected in the Both condition, they may well have responded that budgets are
less likely to be approved. However, their responses to the probability assessment were made
conditional on their cost report which may account for the observed perceptions of budgetary
approval likelihood.
Camerer (2003) discusses the idea that, because the receiver in ultimatum games can
determine their own fate by rejecting the proposer’s offer, the proposer’s behaviour may stem
less from concerns for fairness than from strategic concerns. Agents were asked, “How much
effect do you feel your production cost report had on the manager (owner)?” in two questions in
the PEQ (11-point Likert scale; 1 = “No effect at all”; 11 = “A great deal of effect”). If agents in
fact feel that the manager and/or principal could impact their own payoff through their ability to
reject the budget, then the answer to these PEQ questions should be significantly lower in the
conditions in which the appropriate individual had been granted such authority. However, no
significant differences to these questions are observed between conditions, implying that
concerns for fairness were invariant to the manipulation of rejection authority location.
Rejection Behaviour of Superior Actors
In this section, I shift focus away from the agent’s reports and consider the rejection
behaviour of managers and principals in conditions in which they were imbued with the ability to

The two questions were, “How similar to the manager do you feel you are in general?” and, “How likely is it that
you would be friends with the manager?” Both were significantly correlated and therefore summed for the analysis
presented in the text.
13
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reject the budget. Table 3, Panel A shows the frequency of rejections made by managers and
principals by condition; Panel B provides a more granular breakdown of the rejection behaviour
of the two superior actors in the Both condition. Table 4, Panel A shows the average amount of
slack accepted and rejected by managers in the Both and Manager conditions. Consistent with
the result that slack capture is lower in the Both condition, the average rejected and accepted
agent cost reports are lower in the Both condition than in the Manager condition (p=0.08 for
accepted budgets; p=0.05 for rejected budgets). Further, in both conditions the slack capture in
cost reports that were accepted was significantly lower than the slack capture in cost reports that
were rejected (p<0.01 in both conditions). Recall from the experimental design section that
managers were asked to provide an estimate of the agent’s private production cost information
(similarly, principals were asked to estimate how much profit the manager had to split).
Perceived slack is measured as [Reported Cost – Perceived Actual Cost]/[$27 – Perceived Actual
Cost]. The gap between the average slack capture in accepted reports and rejected reports is
larger in perception in both conditions and the difference remains statistically significant (p<0.01
in both conditions).
Table 4, Panel B shows the manager’s proposed share, as a percentage of the available
profit, when the principal rejected the managers profit split compared to when they accepted the
profit split. The percentage of available profit is calculated as the amount of profit the manager
assigned to themselves divided by the available profit (i.e. $27 minus the cost reported by the
agent). As seen in the table, there is very little difference between the average manager profit
when the principal accepted versus when the principal rejected; this difference is not statistically
significant in either condition (both p>0.30). In fact, in the Principal condition, while the
difference between the average accepted and rejected manager profit is a statistical zero, the
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principal, on average, accepted a smaller share of the surplus than they rejected. This general
result no longer holds when examining the principal’s perception of what they were rejecting
versus what they were accepting. In Table 4, Panel B, the perceived manager percent of profit is
measured as the amount of profit the manager assigned to themselves divided by the principal’s
perception of the amount of available profit. The principal perceived that they were rejecting
manager proposals that were, on average, statistically higher than the proposals they were
accepting (p<0.01 in both conditions).
To better understand this difference in the rejection behaviour of managers and
principals, I examined how accurately managers and principals estimated production costs and
available profit, respectively. To measure accuracy, the following metrics are developed: 14,15
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Note that the average absolute profit deviation measure contains instances in which the manager rejected the
budget. In these cases, the profit available for the manager to split between themselves and the principal was zero.
Recall, however, that the principal only sees that they were offered zero profit and therefore are free to estimate
what the actual profit was from any amount on [$0, $14].
15
An absolute error measure is developed because when the denominator, actual profit, is zero, relative percent error
of profit would be undefined. Actual profit is zero when either the agent reports the maximum production cost of
$27 or the manager rejects the budget. There are 283 of these instances in the data set. Somewhat surprisingly, there
are few, if any, feasible alternative measures of relative percent error, particularly in cases such as this where the
estimated value can also be zero.
14
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TABLE 3: Budget Rejections
Panel A: Frequency of Rejection by Condition
# Manager
Rejections
n/a

# Principal
Rejections
n/a

# Both
Rejected
n/a

Manager
(n=240)

63

0

63
(26%)

Principal
(n=240)

0

133

133
(55%)

Both
(n=204)

54

111

114
(56%)

Condition
None
(n=240)

Panel B: Rejections in the Both Condition

a

Manager Action

Frequency

Accept

150

Approve
Reject

90
60

Reject

54

Approve
Reject

3
51

Principal Action Frequency

a

In the Both condition, if the manager approved the agent's report, the principal was informed of the manager's
allocation of the available profit and then asked to either approve or reject the budget. If the manager rejected the
agent's report, then the principal was informed only that the amount of profit being sent was $0. They were not
informed that the manager had rejected the budget. Panel B shows that, out of the 54 instances in which the
manager rejected the agent's report, the principal also rejected 51 times. In the remaining three instances, they
approved the allocation of $0 that resulted from the manager's rejection of the agent's cost report.
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TABLE 4: Comparison of Accepted versus Rejected Offers
Panel A: Slack Approved vs. Rejected by Managers
Both Condition

Rejected
Budgets

Accepted
Budgets

a

Manager Condition

Actual %
Slack

Perceived
% Slack

Actual %
Slack

Perceived
% Slack

0.6745

0.7810

0.7833

0.6071

n = 54

n = 54

n = 63

n = 63

0.4361

0.3821

0.4848

0.3807

n = 150

n = 150

n = 177

n = 177

Panel B: Manager Profit Approved vs. Rejected by Principals
Both Condition

Rejected
Budgets

Accepted
Budgets

b

Principal Condition

Actual
Manager
% Profit

Perceived
Manager
% Profit

Actual
Manager
% Profit

Perceived
Manager
% Profit

0.6504

0.7531

0.5384

0.7822

n = 60

n = 60

n = 60

n = 60

0.6166

0.6284

0.5705

0.5521

n = 90

n = 90

n = 90

n = 90

a

Actual % Slack is calculated as (Reported Cost - Actual Cost)/($27 - Actual Cost). Perceived % Slack is
calculated as (Reported Cost - Perceived Actual Cost)/($27 - Perceived Actual Cost).
b

Actual Manager % Profit is calculated as (Available Profit - Principal Profit)/Available Profit, where
Available Profit is $27 less the agent's reported cost and Principal Profit is the amount offered to the
principal by the manager. Perceived Manager % Profit is calculated as (Perceived Available Profit - Principal
Profit)/Perceived Available Profit.
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Table 5, Panel A provides descriptive statistics relative to absolute cost deviation and
absolute profit deviation for each condition. Results indicate that managers and principals have a
difficult time accurately estimating the production cost and available profit given the information
asymmetry present in the setting; the managers estimates are incorrect by $3.81 on average and
principals are incorrect by $4.76 on average. In every condition, managers appear to be better at
estimating production costs than principals are at estimating available profit. Specifically,
managers are significantly better at estimating profit in the Manager and None conditions; this is
not the case in the other two conditions. As shown in Table 5, Panel B, comparisons of
estimation accuracy between budget rejections and budget approvals show that both roles are
better at making estimates when they approve than when they reject (these differences are
statistically significant in all conditions for both roles; all p<0.03). When linking these results to
the discussion above regarding differences in the amount of manager surplus rejected versus
approved by principals, the story that emerges is that principals are poor enough at estimating the
amount of available profit when they reject the managers’ proposals that it impedes their ability
to make rational decisions regarding budget rejections. This is meant in the strictest sense of the
term “rationality” – i.e. principals accept smaller shares and reject larger shares in the Principal
condition.

Firm-Level Outcomes
As a final analysis, I examine the firm’s outcomes. Regardless of the agent’s actions, the
bottom-line concern for the firm’s residual claimant (the principal in this setting) is the amount
of residual they claim. To get a sense of how well the firm does under the various budgetary
control schemes, I calculate how much surplus each of the three actors claim in each condition.
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TABLE 5: Accuracy of Estimations
a

Panel A: Average Absolute Cost Deviation and Average Absolute

Average Absolute Cost
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Average Absolute Profit
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
p-value (test of equality of cost
and profit deviations)

Profit Deviation b by Condition
Condition
Both Principal Manager
All

None

$3.81
$3.01
$0.00
$13.80

$3.26
$2.57
$0.00
$13.78

$3.44
$2.72
$0.00
$13.80

$3.67
$2.75
$0.00
$12.33

$4.77
$3.62
$0.00
$13.80

$4.76
$4.25
$0.00
$14.00

$3.37
$3.36
$0.00
$14.00

$3.70
$3.28
$0.00
$14.00

$5.63
$4.51
$0.00
$14.00

$6.11
$4.88
$0.00
$14.00

<0.01

0.70

0.36

<0.01

<0.01

Panel B: Accuracy of Estimations: Approvals vs. Rejections
Condition
Both Principal Manager None
Average Absolute Cost
Budget Approved:
$3.02
n/a
$3.39
n/a
Budget Rejected:
$3.92
n/a
$4.47
n/a
p-value (difference = 0)
0.03
<0.01
Average Absolute Cost
Budget Approved:
Budget Rejected:
p-value (difference = 0)

$2.39
$4.19
<0.01

$2.50
$4.67
<0.01

n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a

a

Absolute cost deviation is measured as the manager's perception of the production cost less the actual
production cost.
b

Absolute profit deviation is measured as the principal's perception of the available profit less the actual
available profit.
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In the participative budgeting setting, the surplus is set once the actual cost is known and
the total amount of surplus available over the course of the twelve rounds of the experiment was
the same for each firm (specifically, $93.10). The percentage of surplus claimed, therefore, is
calculated as the total amount of surplus claimed by agents, managers, or principals in each
condition divided by the total surplus available to the firms in that condition. Figure 4 shows the
average surplus claimed by the firm’s three actors across the four conditions. The portion of the
graph labeled “Lost” is due to situations in which the budget was rejected by at least one of the
superior actors; recall that the result of a rejection is that the entire surplus is foregone. The
figure shows that the choice of whether and where to locate budget rejection authority has a
substantial impact on both how much surplus the firm is able to claim and who, within the firm,
receives the claimed surplus. Generally speaking, granting budget rejection authority to someone
in the firm improves the principal’s share but comes at the cost of the firm rejecting a sizeable
portion of their profitable production. Further, granting budget rejection authority to the
principal, either alone or along with the manager, is particularly damaging to the firm’s overall
ability to take advantage of surplus-generating production as nearly 45% of the total available
surplus is lost to rejected budgets.
Tables 6 and 7 provide additional information on the amount of surplus received by each
role. Table 6, Panel A shows the average amount of surplus received by each role in each
condition and Panel B shows t-test comparisons of these amounts. Overall, the table shows three
results. First, the agent receives less surplus as rejection authority is incorporated. Second, the
manager does best when they are the only individual with rejection authority. Third, the principal
receives a larger share of the surplus when rejection authority has been implemented somewhere
in the firm but does not earn a significantly different share depending on where rejection
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authority has been implemented. Table 7, Panel A provides average surplus received by each role
conditional on the budget not being rejected (Panel B provides associated t-test comparisons).
This panel reveals that, as long as the budget is not rejected, the principal does do best when they
have rejection authority (in the Both and Principal conditions). However, it is clear when
interpreting the overall results from Tables 6 and 7 that the condition in which the principal does
best when “successful” budgeting occurs (i.e. no rejection happens), also comes with the highest
rejection rates which has economic consequences for the principal.

V. CONCLUSION
This study examines the question of where, within the firm’s hierarchy, an important
budgetary control – the authority to reject the budget – should best be located. The literature in
economics on optimal firm height makes the point that, as the firm “grows up,” there is often a
point at which the time constraints and cognitive load placed on the firm’s owner become too
burdensome (e.g. Williamson 1967, Colombo and Grilli 2013). A typical response to this
problem is to grow the firm vertically by incorporating one or more levels of managers. When
this happens, an important decision that needs to be made is exactly which duties should be
delegated to these managers and which should be retained by the principal.
The results of this study yield three broad takeaways. First, in spite of theory-driven
concerns that delegating budget rejection authority to the manager may result in more
misreporting by agents, this study provides evidence suggesting that this is not a primary
concern. Specifically, when only the manager has rejection authority, agent misreporting is
statistically indistinguishable from an arrangement in which the only the principal has such
authority. Second, the question of where to locate budget rejection authority in hierarchical firms
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FIGURE 4
Distribution of Surplus

The percentage of surplus received by each role in each Condition is determined by taking the total amount
of surplus received by a given role in a given Condition and dividing by the total amount of surplus
available in the Condition. For example, there were 20 firms in the Manager condition and each firm could
claim a maximum of $93.10 over the course of the twelve rounds. As a result, there was a total of $1862 of
surplus available, of which the agents received $726.30. Thus, they received $726.30/$1862 = 39% of the
total surplus.
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Table 6: Surplus Received by Role
Panel A: Average Surplus Received by Role and Condition

Agents

Managers

Principals

Both

Condition
Principal Manager

None

Mean
Std. Dev.

17.85%
23.90%

23.02%
30.02%

35.76%
32.06%

77.56%
33.45%

Mean
Std. Dev.

16.13%
20.38%

12.14%
16.67%

28.13%
27.80%

16.02%
24.74%

Mean
Std. Dev.

10.13%
14.01%

9.42%
13.74%

9.86%
11.15%

6.42%
14.89%

Panel B: T-test Comparisons of Received Surplus a
Agents
Manager Principal
None
<0.01
<0.01
Manager
<0.01
Principal

Both
<0.01
<0.01
0.05

None
Manager
Principal

Principals
Manager Principal
None
<0.01
0.02
Manager
0.70
Principal

a

Managers
Manager Principal
<0.01
0.04
<0.01

Both
0.96
<0.01
0.02

Both
0.01
0.82
0.59

: All entries in the tables in Panel B are p-values of t-test comparisons of the average amount of surplus received
in the conditions along the vertical and horizontal axes. For example, the p-value of the t-test comparing the
average surplus received by principals in the Manager and the average surplus received by principals in the Both
conditions is 0.82.
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Table 7: Surplus Received by Role Conditional on No Budget Rejections
Panel A: Average Surplus Received by Role and Condition
Condition
Both

Agents

Managers

Principals

Principal Manager

None

Mean
Std. Dev.

40.47%
19.42%

51.63%
23.25%

48.48% 77.56%
27.85% 33.45%

Mean
Std. Dev.

36.56%
13.84%

27.23%
14.54%

38.15% 16.02%
25.80% 24.74%

Mean
Std. Dev.

22.97%
12.24%

21.14%
13.26%

13.37%
6.42%
11.03% 14.89%

Panel B: T-test Comparisons of Received Surplus

None
Manager
Principal

Agents
Manager Principal
<0.01
<0.01
0.33

Both
<0.01

None
Manager

0.02

Managers
Manager Principal
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01

Principal

<0.01

None
Manager

a

Both
<0.01
0.59
<0.01

Principals
Manager Principal Both
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01

Principal

<0.01
0.32

a

: All entries in the tables in Panel B are p-values of t-test comparisons of the average amount of surplus
received in the conditions along the vertical and horizontal axes. For example, the p-value of the t-test
comparing the average surplus received by principals in the Manager and the average surplus received by
principals in the Both conditions is less than 0.01.
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is nuanced and the best choice critically depends on the exact goal(s) of the firm implementing
the controls. If the goal is to reduce slack capture by the agent, to ensure a more equal
distribution of surplus to the various levels of the firm and/or to ensure that the residual claimant
receives as much surplus as possible, then the results of this study suggest that rejection authority
should be included at every hierarchical layer beyond the first. Third, the incorporation of
rejection authority leads to a sizeable “deadweight loss” due to the rejection of budgets and
entails noticeable economic consequences for the residual claimant. Further, this result has the
flavour of the tradeoff described in Antle and Eppen (1985) in which the principal pre-commits
to funding, at a given hurdle rate, any budget report less than or equal to the hurdle rate (i.e. the
principal provides funds equal to the hurdle rate) and rejecting any report above that. The
fundamental concern stemming from that model is that, in order to curb agent opportunism, the
firm must forego profitable opportunities. Despite that fact no hurdle rate is implemented in this
study, the same type of tradeoff is observed as a result of budget rejection authority.
Additionally, because the both superior actors (particularly the principal) have a difficult time
evaluating the reports of their subordinates, the rejection behaviour of the superior actors may
not make them better off in some instances. This implies that even simple decision aids or
information systems may act to ameliorate the effects of rejections and control agent slack but
cause the firm to give up less in profitable production.
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